The significance of giving as a contemporary socio-economic practice has been obscured both by mainstream economics and by the influence of the anthropological tradition. Andrew Sayer's concept of moral economy offers a more fruitful framework for an economic sociology of contemporary giving, and one that appears to be largely consistent with social quality approaches. This paper analyses giving from the perspective of moral economy, questioning the view that giving is a form of exchange, and opening up the prospect of seeing it as the outcome of a more complex constellation of causal factors. It uses examples from the digital economy, in particular the phenomenon of open source software, which nicely illustrates both the progressive potential of digital gifts and the ways in which they can be absorbed into the commercial economy.
Giving and Reciprocity
Existing sociological accounts of giving have been shaped by the work of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss, or rather by a single short book dating originally from the 1920s, the Essai sur le don, published in English as The Gift (Mauss 2002 (Mauss [1950 ). Mauss's essay is itself in a sense a work of moral economy. He examined anthropological evidence relating to social practices in Melanesia and amongst native Americans, and historical evidence relating to pre-feudal Europeans, and on the basis of this argued that in pre-modern economies the market is marginal. Instead, these societies depended on cycles of deferred gift exchange, which worked in a very different way from the market but nevertheless performed some of the equivalent functions of economic circulation. For Mauss this was a way of criticising the market fundamentalisms of his day, in particular the idea that only markets can coordinate economies, and the utilitarian claim that all economic decisions are, or should be, made by rational calculation of self-interest (Douglas 2002: x, xviii; Mauss 2002 Mauss [1950 : 41,
96-8).
These gift economies, he argues, depend on cycles of giving which take the form of deferred exchanges. They are characterized by a strong set of social obligations to give, to accept gifts, and above all to reciprocate gifts: to return something else of equivalent value at a later date (Mauss 2002 (Mauss [1950 . To return an equivalent immediately was unacceptable in most social situations. This was tantamount to refusing the gift, by transforming the cycle of giving into an instantaneous exchange that conformed instead to the logic of barter (Bourdieu 1990: 105; Godbout and Caillé 1998: 10) . To do so was to undermine the very point of the gift, in which the transfer of goods was secondary to a more fundamental purpose: the creation of a network of social obligations that served to stabilize social relations. The recipient of the gift accepted not only the material gift but also an obligation to reciprocate at some point in the future, an obligation that constituted a social tie between recipient and giver. The implication, as Mary Douglas makes clear in her foreword to the English translation of Mauss's book, is that there can be no free gifts, because in the gift economy every gift generates an obligation to reciprocate (Douglas 2002: ix-x ). Mauss's argument thus fits with the moral economy approach in a further respect: it sees economic transactions as being driven by systems of normative obligation as opposed to (or as well as) rational utilitarian calculations of interest.
However progressive Mauss's intentions, 2 attempts to apply his model of the gift to contemporary societies have had unfortunate consequences. Mauss's insistence on the centrality of reciprocity has been extended uncritically to contemporary giving, but his analysis of gift exchange does not necessarily apply to modern giving (Elder-Vass 2015b). As
Testart has argued, the practices he analysed corresponded more closely to the modern practice of lending than that of giving (1998: 101-2). Seeing gifts as a form of deferred exchange potentially reinstates the utilitarian idea that calculation of self-interest is the motor of these transfers (Graeber 2011: 90) , and unites theories of the gift with conventional economics of the market as varieties of exchangism (Elder-Vass 2015b; Pyyhtinen 2014: chapter 2).
Bourdieu's work on giving is a prime example of this tendency (notably 1990: 97-106) .
Initially he proposes to analyse the practice of giving from two points of view, which he seems to suggest are equally significant (Adloff and Mau 2006: 103) . On the one hand, there is the subjective point of view, the point of view of the actor, from which perspective giving is seen as an act of pure generosity, with no expectation of return and no calculation of reciprocity. On the other, there is the objective point of view, the view of the observing scholar: that careful comparison of giving relationships over a longer period of time reveals that reciprocity does occur, and to such a well-matched extent that it is inconceivable that the actors had not engaged in some degree of calculation. But far from giving these two views equal weight as understandings of the practice of giving, Bourdieu proceeds to label the actors' point of view as a misrecognition of the nature of giving. 4 Both are equally important, he says, but not because he takes the actors' point of view seriously as an account of giving.
On the contrary, the actors' view is important because it provides an ideology of giving, a misrepresentation of it that allows it to function effectively in the building and maintenance of relationships despite the fact that in reality reciprocity rules (Bourdieu 1990: 105-6 ). The so-called subjective view, it turns out, is treated by Bourdieu as part of the object: as a phenomenon that contributes to the overall effect of the practices of giving and not at all as an account of giving that we should take seriously in its own right. Thus Bourdieu produces a thoroughly alienated and alienating account of giving: alienated because it reduces giving to a kind of rational calculating exchange, and alienating because it encourages us all, lay actors included, to treat it cynically as merely a hidden variety of the pursuit of self-interest. As
Osteen puts it, "Bourdieu constantly criticizes economism, arguing that it fails to capture the nuances of transactions as perceived by the actors… And yet his description falls victim to such economism by implying that the economic truth is the most basic one" (2002: 24).
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A second consequence of the Maussian perspective is that giving is sometimes seen as a kind of pre-modern alternative to the market; a mode of economic transfer and social integration that is replaced by the market in modern societies (Mauss 2002 (Mauss [1950 : 59). With the rise of the market, it therefore seems that the gift becomes economically marginal (Adloff and Mau 2006: 99; Negru 2010: 198, 200; Zelizer 1994: 77) (Cheal 1988: 57) but seems to replicate his cynicism by dismissing the idea of generosity towards one's family as part of an "ideology of love" that helps to obscure their real motivations (Cheal 1988: 85-6 ). Godbout has a more persuasive response, seeing denials of the duty of reciprocity as moves that leave the recipient "as free as possible to reciprocate or not", allowing any subsequent gift to act as something other than the deferred completion of an exchange (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 188) .
as, in effect, a residual survival from pre-modern society in a ritualized form of relatively marginal significance to our personal relationships.
This perspective, however, obscures the existence and significance of a vast range of other forms of giving that continue to be of vital importance in contemporary societies, not just in building and sustaining relationships, but also as a crucial element of economic provisioning (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 11; Negru 2010 household. Almost all of us depend utterly in our childhood on the provisioning of our needs by our parents or carers, and indeed such giving often continues on even into adulthood. For Godbout, for example, "the family is the primary site for the gift in society" (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 29 Furthermore, much of this giving is not reciprocal giving. Giving to one's children, for example, is not motivated primarily by the expectation that one will receive a material return of equivalent value from them at some point in the future (Cheal 1988: 8, 57-8; Godbout and Caillé 1998: 24) . This is nicely illustrated by Daniel Miller's account of shopping, which he suggests is "primarily an act of love" (Miller 1998: 18 ) directed on the whole towards the benefit of other members of one's household (Miller 1998: 12) . Similarly, giving to charity is not motivated by the expectation that the recipient will make a return, and as we will see in the following sections, many digital gifts carry no sense of any obligation to reciprocate at all.
Even when there are elements of reciprocity in gift giving practices, exchangist readings of reciprocity may be utterly wrong. If, for example, I receive a birthday gift from you and a few months later I give one to you, the observer may see this as a case of one gift obligating a reciprocal return, a kind of deferred exchange. But this may be a complete misreading of the second gift: rather than being the completion of a deferred exchange of material equivalents, the second gift, and indeed the first one, may be understood, and understood rightly, by the participants as affirmations of commitment to their relationship with each other. The logic in such cases is not a logic of reciprocity of objects, in anything but the most superficial of senses, but a logic of mutual recognition and relatedness of people (Schrift 1997: 2) . There is a kind of empiricism or even behaviourism involved in seeing a sequence in which one gift is followed by another that flows in the opposite direction and defining this as reciprocity.
When such events are interpreted as deferred exchange, in opposition to the selfunderstandings of those involved, this privileges the analyst's exchangist theoretical preconceptions over the understandings of the actors. I do not suggest that such moves can never be justified, but they are always open to challenge.
We must also question the idea of equivalence in reciprocity: the very idea that we measure the value of a gift and thus whether it stands as an equivalent to some other gift imports the logic of the market into a context where it may be utterly alien. 'bonding-value': this is what an object, a service, a particular act, is worth in the world of ties and in their reinforcement. This phenomenon is the polar opposite of accounting value and is completely glossed over by economic discourse, for which ties are synonymous only with exchange (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 173) .
Bonding value is not just a product of what is spent on a gift, but a range of other factors. It is raised, for example, by a gift that shows that the giver "knows what the recipient likes" (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 174) and has chosen the gift to maximize the recipient's pleasure -demonstrating not only concern for their welfare and the devotion of one's time to it but also a degree of intimacy in the relationship. And it is raised by signs that the gift has been de-commercialized, through moves such as the removal of price tags, careful wrapping, and the addition of personalized labels, all indicating both concern for the recipient and a distancing of the object given from the anonymous form of the commodity (Berking 1999: 5-8; Carrier 1995: 29, 150; Godbout and Caillé 1998: 37; Zelizer 1994: 78) . Even "bonding value", however, is a concept in danger of being reinterpreted into the paradigm of exchangism, and we must resist any such slippage by reminding ourselves that "We cannot overlook generosity when we speak of the gift… just because a gift is reciprocated doesn't mean that it is only a mercantile exchange in disguise" (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 175) . Even apparently reciprocal gifts, then, may not fit the exchangist assumptions that are characteristic of the hegemonic discourses of neoclassical economics, and instead should be understood as parts of a moral economy: an economy of transfers that are products of emotional commitments, social relationships, and the normative environment rather than the pursuit of individual material profit, and that are productive of well-being rather than of Gross National Product. 8 But many gifts are not reciprocal at all, and thus still further from any possibility of explanation within the exchangist framework.
Free Gifts
Perhaps the purest cases of the free gift, the gift given with no expectation of return, are gifts to strangers, as analysed by Richard Titmuss in his famous study of unpaid voluntary blood donation (Titmuss 1997) . 9 The volunteer blood donor expects nothing in return for this intensely personal donation; the donor does not know who will receive their gift, and the recipient has no knowledge of the identity of the donor. There may be rather vague hints of reciprocity at work in some cases -the donor who gives because they themselves benefitted from an earlier blood donation, for example -but this is not reciprocity in anything like the sense of giving a precise equivalent back to the original donor in completion of a deferred exchange. Indeed reciprocity is hardly the right word, even here: it might be more accurate to say that the original gift had sensitized the recipient to the social need for the free gift of donated blood and triggered a desire to contribute to meeting that need.
Blood donation, of course, is only one variety of the free gift, and a sub-type of a much larger group of free gifts -charitable giving, whether of money, goods, or in the case of volunteering, time. A great deal of charity is giving to strangers, and one function of organized charities is to act as an intermediary between donor and recipient and thus to remove any mutual knowledge and any sense of obligation for the recipient to reciprocate, 8 Cheal also sees presents as transactions in a "moral economy", which he defines as "a system of transactions which are defined as socially desirable (i.e. moral) because through them social ties are recognized, and balanced social relationships are maintained" (Cheal 1988: 15) .
though not all charity is quite so pure: Zelizer, for example, documents some cases of nineteenth century philanthropy in which donors expected to exert influence on the lifestyles of recipients in exchange for their donations (Zelizer 1994: ch. 4 ).
On the side of donors, charitable giving is motivated by a range of factors. Sanghera, for example, reporting on a study interviewing charitable donors, volunteers and participants in charitable events, divides them into three groups, motivated primarily by (a) social interaction and enjoyment; (b) the opportunity to develop and display knowledge and skills; and (c) a desire "to express their sympathy, compassion and justice for distant and unknown others" (Sanghera 2012: 40) . Clearly, many people do hope to get something back from free giving, but such hopes do not entail that the gift is a form of exchange, nor that it is purely selfinterested. Instead a more variable range of motivations are at work in charitable giving, some of them more oriented to the benefit of others and others less so.
The primary focus of this paper, however, is on digital giving, in the form of digital resources -binary files, encoded electronically and therefore easily transmitted across communication networks -that are placed in publically accessible locations on the internet with the intention that other users may take copies of them without payment. The vast majority of the world wide web is a digital gift, since most web pages are free digital resources (Barbrook 2005 (Barbrook [1998 
Open Source Software
Open source is the product of a counter-cultural movement amongst software programmers who have often been concerned by monopolistic and other restrictive practices of commercial software companies. Richard Stallman, a key figure in the development of the open source movement, argues that software should be free -"'free' as in 'free speech,' not as in 'free beer'" (Stallman 2010: 3) , the point of this distinction being that it is not enough for software to be available at no cost: In addition users should be free to use it as they see fit, free to study how it works and modify it, and free to pass it on to others, with or without any modifications they have made. For this to be possible, users must have access not only to the executable code of the software -the form that is typically made available by commercial software companies -but also to the source code. The source code is the set of program instructions, written in a humanly-readable programming language, that is created by the programmers of the software. Source code needs to be processed further into machinereadable instructions before it can function as a program in a computer, but those machinereadable instructions are more or less impossible for humans to understand and modify. By distributing software only in the form of executable code, commercial software companies therefore prevent users from studying and modifying it. Open source software, by contrast, is supplied with both source and executable code, and often copyrighted under copyleft terms which allow free use, modification, and further distribution of the resulting software (Stallman 2010: 127-8) . 10 This might seem at first sight to be unnecessary -if a programmer intends anyone at all to use their work, why copyright or license it at all? The risk, however, is that commercial companies use their open code, modify it, and then seek to copyright the resulting product as proprietary commercial software -thus transforming the programmer's gift into a commodity that the company owns. By licensing their work under copyleft terms, programmers can ensure not only that their work is distributed freely but also that any commercial companies that modify it are legally obliged to make the modified versions available on the same terms (Stallman 2010: 127-8) .
At first sight, the right to freely modify software might seem like nothing more than a charter for individualistic dabbling. It is unlikely that isolated programmers working on their pet projects would be able to produce software of the power and complexity that is routinely available from commercial software companies. But open source principles, combined with the modularity that is central to contemporary software design, make possible something much more powerful: collaboration among many programmers, each of whom works independently on tasks of their own choosing, and yet generating a loose collective capable of producing software that is as powerful and complex as the proprietary alternatives. Open source programmers identify problems and absences in the software, and modify the code in response. One programmer may fix a bug, another may redesign a function or write the code for a function that the software was previously lacking, and collectively they end up generating increasingly reliable and functional programmes. If multiple programmers all try to fix the same problem or add the same functionality and release the modified code back into the community, then whichever version seems to do the job best is most likely to be adopted by other users -or perhaps another programmer will combine the best of several different versions. Many different programmers, then, who may never meet each other face to face, can cooperate to produce high quality software without the coordination of the market and with minimal hierarchy or authority being required. This is a model of moral economy that
Benkler describes as "commons-based peer production" (Benkler 2002 (Netcraft 2013) . Although Apache is largely invisible to ordinary web users who may be unaware that they are benefiting from it, a more visible product is the widely used web browser Firefox.
Open source software is given freely to its users, and developed in a decentralized collaborative fashion using labor that is freely donated to the project. In one sense it is a model for a moral economy, a post-capitalist form of economic production with overtones of Marx's vision of communism and Kropotkin's anarchistic view of societies based on mutual aid (Kropotkin 2006 (Kropotkin [1902 ), though as we shall see it is far from being free of commercial influence.
In a moment I will consider the motivations of independent individuals who contribute to such projects, but not all contributors to open source projects are independent individuals: in the case of the Linux kernel, for example (which may not be representative), the vast majority of development is done by programmers working for commercial software companies (Corbet, Kroah-Hartman, and McPherson 2012: 9) . These software companies have a range of motivations (Elder-Vass 2015a). Some claim to be influenced by a sense of moral obligation to contribute to communities whose work they benefit from (Anderson-Gott, Ghinea, and Bygstad 2011: 113), but others have explicitly commercial reasons. In particular, companies who contribute to open source products develop skills and a reputation that enables them to sell a range of products and services to organizations that use the product (Anderson-Gott, Ghinea, and Bygstad 2011: 109; Red Hat 2012; Weber 2004: 195-203 ). Yet, although they are motivated by profit, these companies are not pursuing it in anything like the ways that are theorized in the economics of commodity production. They are making gifts to the open source community, without any guarantee of return, and hoping to benefit indirectly as a result. At such interfaces between the market economy and the moral economy strange hybrids grow.
The motives of individual open source programmers can also be somewhat instrumental (Lerner and Tirole 2002) . Significant contributors receive recognition and prestige from
others in the open source community, a kind of professional symbolic capital (Lerner and Tirole 2002: 213) . In addition to being personally gratifying, such capital may also be convertible to a more economic form, since it enhances the programmer's CV and the possibilities of well-paid work (Lerner and Tirole 2002: 213, 217-220) . It seems unlikely, however, that the distant prospect of such an outcome provides the initial motivation for many contributors, and there are many other motivations that fit much more readily with moral economy's understanding of economic action than with that of conventional economics. One is "the pleasure of creation" (Benkler 2002 : 424) -many of these programmers enjoy the challenge of solving coding problems. For them, programming is not a burden that must be compensated for by some other reward, but a pleasure: the pleasure of labor in which the worker chooses her task, controls her own labor process and product, interacts with fellow workers as a free and equal individual, and exercises her creativity to create something of value to the wider human community. This is work as the obverse of alienated labor as described by Marx (1978 Marx ( [1844 : 74-6), work freed from the tyranny of the market and instead harnessed to human flourishing.
The Battle for the Digital Economy
The Internet today is a battleground between two competing digital economies. On the one hand, we have the commercial economy lionized by neoliberal politicians and neoclassical economists which is generating new digital corporate monopolies (Morozov 2015) ; on the other we find, not the state, which is gradually being transformed into little more than a servant of this first economy, but rather the gift economy. The digital gift economy operates in many forms (for further examples see Benkler 2004: 381-397) , but one of the most interesting is the collaborative form at work in phenomena like Wikipedia and the open source software movement, a form that is "sustainable and productive in the digitally networked environment without reliance either on markets or managerial hierarchy" (Benkler 2002: 374) . This "underappreciated modality of economic production" (Benkler 2004: 276) has been marginalized in economic and indeed sociological discourse, and yet already constitutes a major sphere of economic activity.
Such activities are enabled and stimulated by the technical characteristics of the digital environment (Barbrook 2005 (Barbrook [1998 ) and the nature of information goods (Benkler 2002: 404) . 12 Digital giving is giving without sacrifice: digital goods are nonrival, meaning that we can give them without giving up the thing that we are giving away. At the same time, it costs virtually nothing to distribute these digital goods over the Internet. Combined, these factors have transformed the economics of information based goods, so that it is no longer essential for producers to achieve a return on every item they distribute. If a million people consume a digital product and only a tiny fraction of them contribute to its cost of production (whether by making a payment to the original producer or by donating labor themselves to further development of the product) this may be enough to sustain a vibrant information economy.
Despite this opportunity, and despite the many interesting giving practices that are blossoming on the Internet, there are also many strong reasons to restrain claims for the potential of the digital gift economy. One limitation arises from the very factors that have just been stressed: virtually costless distribution of gifts that entails no sacrifice by the donor is only a characteristic of digital information goods. There is little reason to believe that similar economic processes might roll back the non-digital market economy in the way that the open source movement has generated a tendency for the decommodification of software. 13 Indeed, the digital gift economy itself clearly depends on other sectors of the economy that are currently dominated by the market: for example, the hardware and networks that make the digital gift economy possible are themselves physical products created in the commercial economy, and independent programmers that contribute to open source software must have other sources of income to support them, which are often derived from the commercial economy (Barbrook 2005 (Barbrook [1998 ).
Digital gifts can also be turned quite directly to the service of capital. There is an important range of giving practices that we may call commercial giving or inducement giving, in which a gift is given for the purpose of inducing a subsequent transaction that generates profit for the original donor (Anderson 2009; Elder-Vass 2015a: 245-248 chapter 8; Levy 2011: part 2). While some other forms of giving can be seen as alternatives to digital capitalism, inducement giving is very much a part of it: "an entanglement of gifts within the commodity form" (Fuchs 2008: 171) .
Certain elements of the digital gift economy also face attempts at outright suppression by government, acting in the interests of pre-digital media corporations. Most notably, governments have been persuaded by lobbyists for these corporations to extend copyright protection in an attempt to prevent the free distribution of vast amounts of digital media products (Gillespie 2007: chapter 4; Lessig 2004 ). 14 Open source software seems likely to escape this, partly because of some clever work on copyleft licensing, but perhaps more so, ironically, because of the many ways in which it has become embedded in commercial 14 In marked contrast to the ways in which several of the major media industries were built on gaps in earlier copyright regimes (Lessig 2004: chapter 4 (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) .
Conclusion
Giving is a major form of economic transfer in contemporary societies and yet it is largely ignored by mainstream economics and indeed by Marxist political economy. Family care, charity, volunteering and the growing range of digital gifts are only some of the means by which giving is productive of human flourishing, and the scale of this contribution is such that it is misleading to think we live in a purely market economy (Benkler 2004: 331) . Rather, we inhabit a moral economy that takes the form of a "gift-market nexus" (Negru 2010: 194) .
The gift element of this economy is not only productive of flourishing through the goods it produces and transfers, but also through the opportunities it provides for building relationships, expressing our feelings, unalienated labor and the pleasure of giving: all things that contribute to the quality of social life but have no exchange value and thus are ignored by mainstream economics. It is one of the strengths of Andrew Sayer's approach to moral economy that, like the social quality approach, it allows us to see that these other sources of flourishing are at least as important as those things that are valued in monetary terms and should be given at least as much weight in decisions about how we run our societies.
Another is that it enables us to see that the pursuit of material gain through market exchange is far from the only form and far from the only motivator of economic activity, even in our contemporary, apparently capitalist-dominated economy. While some gifts are entangled with such motives, most are not a form of exchange or even an inducement to exchange. What is remarkable about digital giving is that while historically the market has been steadily spreading its tentacles deeper and deeper into the realm of the lifeworld, the rise of the Internet has contributed to some unprecedented processes of decommodification, such as we have seen with the growth of open source software.
At the same time, however, the digital sphere has seen the blossoming of a wide range of forms of giving that are deeply entangled with the capitalist economy. At least some giving
practices have been open to subornment to the interests of commercial business; and others have been suppressed to protect those interests. Digital giving both competes with and threatens the market model and is developing within the commercial sector and being put to
